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ABSTRACT 
This chapter presents the transcript of a question and answer session that followed 
a debate on the case study and formal modeling approaches to IT valuation between Benn 
Konsynski, Harvard University and Charles Kriebel, Carnegie Mellon University. The 
debate was held in a panel session chaired by Rajiv Banker, University of Minnesota, and 
it occurred at the 1991 International Conference on Information Systems, December 17, 
1991. Konsynski's and Kriebel's formal remarks were directed towards evaluating the case 
study approach and the formal modeling approach to IT business value assessment, and are 
presented in separate chapters in this volume. The discussion generated by their remarks 
is captured here, and will be especially interesting to senior managers who daily must face 
hard choices about investing in information technology. 
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EVALUATING RESEARCH APPROACHES TO IT BUSINESS VALUE ASSESSMENT 
WITH TElE SENIOR MANAGEMENT AUDIENCE IN MIND 
The Question and Answer Session began with comments from Benn Konsynski and Charles 
Kriebel. 
Opening comment from Benn Konsynski: 
I don't think anybody would disagree with the fact that hygiene in methodology 
characterizes most of the problems that we have in selecting among approaches. We 
certainly don't want to stretch any method beyond its utility to inform. If we go back to 
Kuhn and think about the interpretation of scientific revolutions, the term "paradigm" arises 
and we take it as dealing with issues of the rules of research or of observation. The 
paradigm that we are using involves a pattern of explanation so far as we are involved in a 
paradigm. 
IS research efforts form a pattern for explaining the "business value" phenomenon. 
Often it is very difficult to do so with the kind of rigor we would like. And, often it may 
be premature, and we may only have weak evidence of a phenomenon in the business arena, 
and we may need other means of creating a pattern of explanation in advance of the rigor 
that we might wish to have for full explanation. 
Witness the kind of frustration Einstein had with the statistical quantum theory. 
Researchers were unable to fully explain the behaviors observed, and felt it was a cheat to 
go to the statistical patterns of explanation. It's not unlike that when we consider the 
measurement of the business value of investments in information technology. 
Response from Charles Kriebel: 
The issue with physics, if you will, has been that one of the benefits or advantages 
that the physicist has -- versus what we have as social scientists -- is data availability. Often 
the physicist can just leave the equipment running over the weekend, and take the 
observations on Monday morning. 
A couple of years ago, there was a conference of scientists from the natural and the 
social sciences that was held in Arizona. It included distinguished economists like Ken 
Arrow, and one of the things that surprised the physicists was how rigorous the economists 
were, and how demanding they were, in terms of formal models in their analysis. The 
physicists had thought the economists were doing research more casually, despite the 
conventional wisdom. 
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The weakness of just taking a look at isolated incidents -- via cases or field studies, 
for example -- is that it is hard to try to generalize from them. I think the point that Benn 
raised in our formal debate about who is to be informed, general management versus 
academics, is also a real problem. This gets back to the dominance of the financial analysts 
and the accountants who will push management, perhaps in response to management's 
demand, for simple procedures and measures. So, we talk about net present value, and the 
question is: What goes into that calculation? There's nothing wrong with the concept of the 
time value of money. The problem is filling in the detail for the equations, the 
requirements, or the procedures. 
Let me make one point (and this is not necessarily a dig at the Harvard Business 
School), but the pioneering concept in the 1980s of those strategic IT cases has been 
recanted somewhat in the 90's via interviews with many faculty at the Harvard Business 
School in a recent issue of CIO magazine. Nevertheless, this enabled the field to gain 
experience in building a cumulative tradition. 
A formal model may have short-circuited some of that initial reasoning. Positive 
theory or research is very important to try to explain and understand phenomena, and I 
think in many cases, it often has to lead to normative theory. 
Question from the audience: 
Both speakers referred to the role of IT in achieving a strategic advantage in 
changing the way you do business. But, achieving a strategic advantage of that sort means 
we're playing a new game, And yet, the complaint is that research hasn't shown that we're 
playing the old game better. 
It seems to me that this is a problem in both approaches. We aren't able to show that 
IT is giving us an improvement in the old ways of doing things, and yet, the basic advantage 
of IT is that we're not playing that same game anymore. So, both research approaches seem 
to somehow be asking the wrong question in that sense. 
Response from Charles Kriebel: 
What would be the right question? 
I think there has been some excellent work done at the national level, and this 
morning Paul Gray, in responding to Arnold Penzias' keynote address at ICIS, cited some 
of it. The governmental data there is terrible and some of the other analysis applied to it 
is fairly naive (in the sense of just trying to run regressions and see what happens). 
In my own work and the work of others in that area, there has been a conscious 
effort to look deeper into the issues, as opposed to just trying to, say, see if the investments 
in personal computers has had an impact on the gross domestic product (or some other 
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aggregate measure like that) over the last ten years. 
Follow-up question from the audience: 
Well, the kind of models you're talking about will generally tell you about before and 
after, assuming that before and after represent the same processes, correct? 
Response from Charles Kriebel: 
Yes. And often this is not the case because of the structural changes that are taking 
place with respect to the introduction of IT, as well as services that were never available. 
Comment from Benn Konsynski: 
Part of my concern is the attribution that is made to criticize the intrinsic value 
delivered by the technology. Our problems don't lie in determining strategy; they also don't 
lie in selecting improper technologies. Instead, our problems lie in the execution -- in the 
delivery of those technologies to try to bring value, business service value, to the enterprise. 
And so it's very difficult, I find, to make judgements in the aggregate that often lend 
themselves to, or at least, are inferred as criticisms of the investment, or the nature of the 
investment, rather than the quality of the process of investing in the technologies that we 
have. 
The strategic hits for information technology maybe are poorly explained, but they're 
nonetheless significant and real. If we hear, ad nauseam, about cases such as American 
Hospital Supply, still there is something that really did happen there. And there's something 
else that happened in the airline industry. There's something that has happened in health 
care. There's something that has happened in the distribution industry. There is an 
electronic integration taking place across buyer and seller communities in many industries. 
But we need to pay attention to many of these phenomenon from a business potential 
standpoint. Ignoring the detailed assessment of the business value technology is warranted 
in view of the leverage they can create. Yet, we make our judgments based on the things 
that we're comfortable measuring, on transaction economics and so forth. 
We have to judge not only the intent for institutional change, as well as the intent of 
technological change. We also must clearly pay attention to what measures it benefits and, 
as Charlie Kriebel points out, the real costs are not usually honestly stated. We don't fully 
burden the measurements and costs in most of our investments. 
Question from the audience: 
This goes back to a remark that Dr. Kriebel made about accounting measures for 
effective information technology. Consider the following paradox. Suppose in a community 
there are two hospitals and we introduce new technology in these hospitals so that all the 
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patients are able to leave hospitals more quickly, because they are able to get better more 
quickly. But, because of the competition between the two hospitals, neither of them shows 
an increased profit on the bottom line. Still, the patients are doing better than they were 
before. 
Are the patients being left out in the analysis? Does the analysis indicate that 
information technology has no benefit to society? 
Response from Charles Kriebel: 
We often talk about the "spillover benefits" of information technology in 
circumstances like this. The phrase "spillover benefits" was coined by Tim Breshnahan of 
Stanford Business School, in a paper that appeared some time ago in the American 
Economic Review, He found that with all the investment in information technology 
investments made by American commercial banks in the last several decades, in the end it 
appears that the real benefits went to bank customers. They benefitted from lower prices 
and increasing service levels, while it was not clear that the bankers received equal returns. 
We should include benefits such as those that accrue to hospital patients or bank 
customers as part of the equation. Certainly we should incorporate them when we perform 
them at the societal level. The analysis would be incomplete without considering the so- 
called "consumer surplus". Indeed, there has been some excellent research on these issues 
in the economics literature as far as information technology goes. 
But, how does the CEO explain what happened to the corporation's shareholders? 
Does he say: 
"We14 we lost money. But ifyou use this larger equation, society is much better 
off because now we're all providing better services in a capitalist society.'" 
Follow-up question from the audience: 
Maybe it could be that if one hospital improved the technology, and the other did 
not, then you cannot make the usual accounting assumption of "a going concern": it may not 
be "going" for long. 
Response from Charles Kriebel: 
That brings me to something which I was going to say before. How do we measure 
the performance of management? It's the audience of the customer services where 
evaluation has to occur, but that's not all. It's basically expost outcomes that get the most 
scrutiny. In other words, if the manager does well, we'll see it at the bottom line. If he 
doesn't, he still may have made all the right decisions. 
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One could debate this, but look at the situation facing John Akers. Would you blame 
all of IBM's recent profitability problems on Aker's performance as a manager, or do you 
say: "No, it's been the economy, it's been competition, or this and that." So, it isn't 
necessarily a matter limited to the audience we're trying to serve. The technology we're 
trying to bring to serve our customers interrelates with it. It was there all the time. 
Comment from Benn Konsynski: 
Related to the valuation issue and the specialist, say, on the consumer's side, we're 
looking for some consumer surplus that's defined by some assessment of the "willingness to 
pay", or some sense of valuing against the price they're paying for health care that may 
define a consumer surplus for us. I think that has to be stretched to all stakeholders in 
looking at the environment, not just saying we've got to add the consumers in there. 
In fact, we have a full spectrum of stakeholders that need to be brought into the 
equations, into our analytics, if that's our suggestion in doing so. Whether we're doing 
ethnographic work, whether we're doing analytics as well, we've got to make some 
assessment of the broad portfolio of stakeholders and bring in those stakeholders' surplus 
as a benefit or return. And, then here again, the causality challenge raises its ugly head. 
Our ability to identify correlates is challenge enough for many of us, let alone trying to make 
causal arguments. 
Question from the audience: 
One of the things we do frequently in looking at the business value of information 
technology, as Charles Kriebel claimed, is to boil it down to the value that you get by doing 
better than your competitors. If one focuses on cars, and looks at information technology 
invested to promote cost reduction, it often turns out that all your competitors are doing the 
same thing. You're not increasing business value, but as the earlier question demonstrated, 
maybe you're increasing social welfare. 
How does one go about assessing business value in terms that a manager could use 
in trying to decipher whether to do something regarding technology? 
Response from Benn Konsynski: 
Here again, I have to be careful I don't cross the border into Charlie's camp in 
support of formal modeling in some of my responses. 
We have a great opportunity in talking to senior managers now. We have their 
attention much more so than in the past. In part, this is because of the extraordinary 
proportion of budgets that are going towards something that they're not certain has delivered 
value to them. Traditionally. they have shied away from cases that are often made via 
narrow-minded analytics that try to make a broader statement on the lack of delivery of 
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business value for the investments. But today, I think, they are much more receptive than 
they were in the past. You can make arguments clearly of necessity and deliver exemplars, 
and here's where cases do a great service, (or possibly a disservice) in delivering the 
messages to the community of potential investors. 
The problem is that information technology changes what is possible from the 
business function standpoint. And, the general manager who is ill-attuned to the changes 
in business potential needs to be educated on the direction of change from an institutional 
or business standpoint that the technology can create. Cases are often a vey  effective means 
of getting them to conceptualize, to think, to stretch their imagination and help them 
challenge their own assumptions that constrain their view or vision of their business. 
This is something that the analytics certainly can almost never do -- getting them to 
challenge their own assumptions or beliefs about the limitations of their o w  vision for their 
enterprises, and for their marketplaces. Hence, I think there are ways of persuading via 
measures and metrics of change, but the nature of the business cases also offer a way to get 
general managers to perceive, or at least stretch, their understanding of the limits of what 
is possible (to steal a phrase from Frederick Rodell). 
Comment from Charles Kriebel: 
I think that it's clear that management is results-oriented. If it's a success, then it's a 
success and it worked. And, how do you know if a marketing plan, a big advertising 
campaign, worked? Well, if sales went up it did. If they didn't, it was a bust. But, 
marketing and the need to advertise is a little more penetrable to a senior manager's mind 
than saying we're going to invest in fiber-optics or something. It's a question of "What can 
that do for us?" This is the challenge to us. 
Let me also say that typically the cases or stories that are told are stories of success. 
So a manager can inadvertently look at what is going on and say, "OK, I don't sell beer, but 
I can see how that might work in panty hose or something else, in terms of a campaign." 
They may not see the inherent risks of adopting similar tactics. 
I think the challenge to us is really to define reasonable metrics, metrics that'll be 
acceptable to management, and then find out how to apply those to information technology. 
Despite the pervasiveness of IT, how to make it work well for the firm is still mysterious to 
many people. I was on sabbatical a few years ago and worked in industry. My boss, who 
was a senior vice president, had a personal computer in a wooden cabinet right next to his 
desk. He never turned it on. But it was there, so if you looked in, you'd say this is obviously 
an organization with modern management . 
The other thing I was going to say which I think is a problem in measurement is the 
"productivity paradox", a point that was made well by Bob Gordon of Northwestern 
University in his presentation earlier today. There's a lot of wasted technology in this, pure 
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and simple. One of Gordon's examples is the electronics that are on the top-of-the-line 
BMW car. There's so much electronics, in fact, that the car comes with a 45-minute 
videotape on how to operate them, including a 3-minute segment on how to lock & unlock 
the doors. 
This reminds me of something Ted Withington recently told me. He now lives in the 
city, and Ted doesn't own a car, he rents one. Recently he rented a Chrysler Imperial and 
when he went to try and turn on the radio, he couldn't figure out how to work it. He took 
out the manual and in the manual it said that in the glove compartment is a 5-minute audio 
you can plug into the cassette -- it'll explain how to operate the radio! 
Another example is VCRs that you can be programmed to record two years in 
advance. Well, think about how many shows last a season, which is 6 weeks or so long, let 
alone two years into the future. (Perhaps the "Cosby Show" is an exception.) Or microwave 
ovens ... you can program them to go on automatically. I thought the whole idea behind the 
microwave oven was that when you wanted to cook something, you pop it in for two minutes 
as opposed to setting it automatically to start, while you're driving home from work on the 
thruway. 
Comment from Benn Konsynski: 
This is true not only of information technology. We build highways and they result 
in traffic gridlock. We build airports and we wind up sitting in the airports for long times. 
Again, my challenge is this: let's make sure we understand our indictment of the technology, 
versus the designs and the institutional changes that take place (or should take place) to 
leverage the business value of those technologies. 
Question from the audience: 
Well, I think I've heard a plausible recommendation that people should use 
methodologies and metrics that are appropriate to the question. But that doesn't seem to 
map very well with my impression of the information technology literature, which associates 
personalities with a particular style of research or a particular methodological approach. 
Are we looking for the best, most appropriate methodology to approach questions of 
IT value? Or, are we mostly methodological specialists who look first for the data and then 
later for the questions that can be answered with it? 
Response from Charles Kriebel: 
Obviously, there is a concern that if you are coming as a researcher to address a 
specific question, you're going to come with whatever your skills are. If I need carpentry 
work done, I've got to go to the carpenter, but maybe in building a house, we need the 
carpenter, the plumber, and the electrician. So there's a natural bias there. The question 
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or the caveat is that you don't say that's the complete answer, because you may have left out 
some of the dimensions of value. A consideration of the characteristics of the 
implementation effort, for example, are often left out. Economics assumes rationality: it 
doesn't address that issue even though that may be the difference between whether there's 
a payoff or there isn't. 
Comment from Benn Konsynski: 
I think that's true. Certainly we all have our biases and historic preferences for 
certain tools and techniques and it's very difficult as we all know. We can't separate the tool 
from the user of that tool in making our assessment of value and productivity, even in our 
own research side of the house. Many of us, though, don't take the time to appreciate 
alternative methodologies. 
I challenge each of you to make sure that you have exercised the full spectrum of 
analytics. You might consider trying out laboratory research, if only in joint work, for 
example. But unfortunately, few of us find time to consider or apply multiple research 
paradigms. I'm most concerned because this prevents communication. It prevents 
communication within the research community and it prevents communication from the 
research community to practice. The latter is a very important element because we are an 
applied field. 
I think we fail, in part, because we've become entirely too wedded to one approach. 
Whether we're skilled at it or not, at least we should broaden our own horizons and 
experience. I've certainly tried to do that in my career in looking at a variety of approaches, 
and exercising even those that I completely reject or have had occasion to criticize. I think 
it's very important from the viewpoint of communicating and understanding results; it also 
enables us to gain an appreciation of each other's experience. I don't think we're as tolerant 
of each others practices as we should be. 
Question from Rajiv Banker: 
Then can you explain how we can use lab experiments to study business value? 
Response from Benn Konsynski: 
With that exception in mind, I find it very difficult (except for microcosmic impacts' 
assessments) to find out how I can leverage lab experiments to look at the business value 
that is delivered, except from a narrower perspective. It's the same with some of the 
analytics where I think we need to challenge their appropriateness in offering the broad view 
that is needed in order to fully explain the phenomenon or even explain the theory of 
business value. 
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Comment from Charles Kriebel: 
Let me just add there's a field that's developed called "human- computer interaction", 
which is primarily concerned with designing interfaces. Much of that research is directed 
towards improving communication between the system and the human. There is currently 
much research interest on "groupware technologies", for example, and a lot of that is 
experimental. It's either conducted in the lab or it's conducted in a larger experimental 
design. 
Question from Benn Konsynski: 
But, does it address itself to business value delivery? 
Response from Charles Kriebel: 
No, not immediately, but ultimately it might. 
Question from the audience: 
Can I take the research question in just a slightly different direction from adding 
value to the information systems area? 
The case methodology seems to be fairly well accepted within the IS research area. 
However, at the university where I'm at we often review research proposals that have been 
made by various faculty members throughout the university community. Whenever a case 
study proposal gets into that hopper there, it always ends up on the bottom because the rest 
of the faculty doesn't seem to think much of that kind of methodology. 
I wonder whether IS researchers are well served by using that methodology if we're 
having that kind of recognition problem within the rest of the community? 
Response from Benn Konsynski: 
Again it's back to who's being informed. The intent of the research is to inform a 
specific kind of audience. 
Within the academic stream, the perception comes from the criticisms that are made 
outside the business school. The reason why Harvard Business School is across the river 
from the rest of the University (and the reason why most of you are in buildings that are 
separated from other schools), is in part to isolate us. We're considered to be tainted 
because we deal with the kind of practice and audience that does not value the rigor or 
training that we use for our research. It's always a big challenge. It's a big challenge for 
Promotion & Tenure. I certainly would not recommend that junior faculty (unless they're 
in particular institutions that may value that approach) to focus entirely on case study-related 
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fieldwork. I certainly would not recommend that they exercise that as the sole direction, or 
even the dominant part of their portfolio of research. 
Comment from Charles Kriebel: 
Let me add though, you've broadened this discussion so that it goes beyond the 
business school. Looking at the case method, if you will, as strictly the Harvard Business 
School writing of cases, I would disagree. I think there's good precedent if we say there's 
analogy to clinical research in medicine. A lot of that goes on (and I think it's accepted) and 
a lot of the advances (probably a number of them) that are made in biology have come out 
of that type of approach. What about archeology? You've got to get out to the field to 
discover things and to explain things. It may not be labeled the case method, per se, but the 
clinical approach to research or experimentation has a tradition in science, as well. 
Comment from Rajiv Banker: 
Let me second what Charlie said. 
This is a method that has been used in a lot of different areas. One area that Charlie 
left out is astrophysics. Going back many centuries, it was Keppler's detailed and accurate 
measurement of the solar system that led to all the theories that Newton later developed 
about gravitation. If he had not had that one case study (the solar system), we very likely 
would not have had the theory for a while. 
The key here is careful measurement, and one of the criticisms that I've come across 
is that in many case studies and case study proposals, there has not been an attempt to 
carefully measure what's going on. I think that really makes a difference. 
Comment from Benn Konsynski: 
You have to be careful though and not defeat the whole purpose of doing the case 
study and field research by expecting that you can fulEy understand how you're going to 
describe and explore the phenomenon. Ethnographically, research in general has had a big 
challenge in many of our communities. Even though we have additional experience with 
case study research in other fields, still the Promotion & Tenure process does not value that 
approach to research. It's got to be a personal challenge in understanding which of your 
portfolio methods you're going to exercise as an individual and how you will manage your 
career. 
Question from the Rob Kauffman: 
I have a question that I think both of the panelists might be able to respond to. It 
deals with how much we can really expect to get out of methods that intend to measure 
investments today, yet may not pay off for years in the future. I guess my particular concern 
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comes when we look at investments in new technologies (e.g., imaging) and I've seen trading 
work stations invested in very heavily here in the last five years in New York City. Case 
technology is another area of significant investment in new information technology. 
Measurement in a sense becomes a matter of measuring the vision, the 
entrepreneurship, and the persistence of the people who are there managing those 
investments to fruition. 
HOW do you apply capital budgeting to that and come up with black ink? 
Response from Rajiv Banker: 
I think that's a critical part of the challenge. 
Part of the problem is we're focusing on the technology rather than the institutional 
change. That's why we need to be measuring it from a business intent standpoint. For 
example: 
* Where does the business expect it wants to be 5 and 10 years from now? 
* In what kind of market will it participate? 
* With what kinds of competition? And in what ways will it compete? 
* What are the bases of competition? 
Those are the questions that we need to raise first in order to make the judgements 
on the nature of the investments. And we can't get those labeled in advance of those 
investments. 
Now, if we can't do that, then we have no hope of making any intermediary 
judgments on the quality of any capital investment in a technology platform that involves an 
infrastructure change. How would we have known that the highway system would transform 
post-war society? How could we have guessed that the telephone system that we were 
putting in place would transform the social system and the business environment? What 
would we have used to aid in making those kinds of judgements? 
All too often, we have to measure against a more general vision of a transformation 
of that institution -- whether it's society, whether it's a marketplace, or whether it's the 
enterprise itself. 
We have to hazard a guess in making some of those investments that we can't fully 
justify from a near return standpoint. 
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It's a major challenge, especially when we've got an aging plant, or our bridges are 
in need of repair. American corporations have tens of millions of lines of COBOL, and 
those lines may represent an embedded an outdated approach to doing business, an ossified 
business policy. That's fine, but keep in mind that it's a twenty year-old business policy. 
Meanwhile, we have a whole new marketplace for business. 
How do we deal with those kinds of investments that we've sunk, as well as in making 
our judgments on investing in the replacement? We can't face that as a society in terms of 
our bridges. 
Should we expect our corporations to have some greater insights into such questions? 
Comment from Charles Kriebel: 
It's a very good question, but it's not peculiar to IT, as Benn said. You know, the 
thought of stringing wires all around the country was obviously insane and very impractical 
at the time. 
How do you measure the quality of creativity, imagination? 
Obviously, there's an expost test -- you know, that guy was a genius, a visionary, or 
he was an idiot. But, it's very difficult to do that beforehand. 
I don't think the case study approach to research is truly limited by its subjectivity. 
One of the benefits I was going to mention earlier about case-based research is discovery. 
I believe the HIV virus came out of discovery. That was on a clinical basis and now that's 
considered one of the most serious medical challenges facing science today. 
Follow-up question from Rob Kauffman: 
One of the recent proposals in IT investment evaluation research has been made by 
Brian Dos Santos who spoke here earlier. It's related to the use of option pricing. It came 
out of the research and development literature, which was dealing with the problem of how 
to go forward with investments for research on pharmaceuticals. It may be a one-in-fifty, 
or a one-in-a-hundred chance that the research would deliver a drug that really would do 
something for society, making the firm that developed it very profitable in the process. 
Should we be thinking about pricing technology options, where you try to build vision 
of the future that incorporates the possibility of learning, flexibility and abandonment into 
what you're trying to measure in the present? We know that net present value and 
straightforward cash flow analysis will never be able to do that. 
But, do you see anything on the horizon that represents a methodology for making 
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that a better process that management can go through? 
Response from Charles Kriebel: 
Where is the market for those options? Is this within the firm? 
Comment from Rob Kauffman: 
Well, there was an interesting example recently in New York City. The firm was 
called CapitalLink, a joint venture involving J.P. Morgan (the large commercial bank), and 
David Jeffrey, an entrepreneur with a vision that the move towards automation in the 
financial markets would ultimately extend to both equity and debt trading. Jeffrey's effort 
was to create an electronic bond issuance market. 
It failed very rapidly though, because the market really wasn't ready for the electronic 
issuance of bonds. The institutional players were there, but they just didn't want to commit 
to it. On the other hand, now that company has failed others have picked up the idea 
(Electronic Joint Venture Partners, for example) and they're creating a really transformed 
electronic financial marketplace. I suspect that Jeffrey was out of the money because he was 
too early. So, I think that yes, there is a market for those kinds of options; firms can go in 
and buy things that have failed with the vision and the managerial expertise of those that are 
stuck in one company. The same investment in another context can pay off. 
Comment from Charles Kriebel: 
I guess that one of the things that came up in another session at ICIS was about 
electronic versus the traditional markets, at least those run in the United States for example. 
The question was: Is risk the issue or is liquidity the issue? And, the specialist obviously 
provides the liquidity if there are -trades that don't clear at the current prices. 
Comment from Benn Konsynski: 
I think it's a part of the whole organization transformation that is taking place, in 
general, in the institutions of the next century. We need to cast out our old accounting 
practices, we need to cast out some of our old management practices as well. And, here 
again, let's not apply the technology, to speed up the mess. Let's take the changes in 
technology and its management as an opportunity to exercise new management practice for 
new business processes. I think it's a quite valid option in managing a variety of resources, 
not just the IT function. 
Comment from Charles Kriebel: 
The only issue there, in terms of not being an accountant, is who's going to do the 
casting out? It won't be fram within, you can believe that. 
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Comment from Rajiv Banker: 
This has nothing to do with options. It's more of a comment. 
I don't know how many of you saw the Wall Street Journal. Sometime in the first 
week of last month there was a story about these very studies that Charlie and Benn alluded 
to -- the ones that show that there's been a negative impact from IT investment. 
Comment from Benn Konsynski: 
Gary Loveman, and Roche and Bourne, I think. 
Comment from Rajiv Banker: 
Right. 
In the past, what we've seen in places like the Wall Street Journal -- which I think 
most of you read -- were all positive stories. We've never seen anything quite as negative 
about the payoff of IT investment in the past. I think they have an effect on the perceptions 
of all of us. Incidentally, there is supposed to be an in-depth article in 
COMPUTERWORLD -- I'm not sure whether it's shown up or not yet -- that does much 
the same thing. 
What, if anything, can we do to prevent these stories like that from showing up in 
these places? 
Question from Charles Kriebel: 
Do you mean, only tell good news? Or make sure the bad news is accurate? 
Response from Rajiv Banker: 
Let's make sure the bad news is qualified, as you did in your presentation -- you and 
I know what the problems are of the datasets they've used, and so forth. 
Let's tell it like it is. 
Comment from Charles Kriebel: 
I know from CIOs I've talked to, one of their terrors is when an article like that 
comes out and the CEO sees it. It gets circled and sent down to some senior guy with a big 
question mark. The success stories -- they get passed by. 
It's always a challenge for the CIO to try and thwart the propaganda, especially the 
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negative propaganda. 
Comment from Benn Konsynski: 
This field is ripe with hydrofoil literature -- the fast and shallow, surface articles that 
are either on the positive side or negative side -- and they usually wind up exactly as Charlie 
says. This often happens when executives are flying in the plane five miles closer to the sun 
and reading some insidious airline magazine that has a two page article on how somebody 
made a big strategic hit. They give you a superficial story that says "throw a terminal on 
their desk and you've got them for life" -- some aspect like that. 
We've had that problem heavily on the good side. We've over-sold the market. 
We've also over-hung the market in terms of our service delivery and now we have to suffer 
some of the pangs of that same form of literature and communication, which is only 
succeeds because of the ignorance on both sides -- the ignorance of the technology people 
on the business, and the business people on the technology. 
That's why I advocate educating and bringing the senior executives into the discussion. 
I think they benefit from it. I think we will as well. 
Comment from Charles Kriebel: 
To complete the picture, I think that to quote superficial success stories is as bad as 
quoting the superficial negative ones, or maybe the real disasters. 
The circled story comes down and it says: "Why aren't we doing this?" 
But, if you look at all those articles in the airline magazines, it's usually written by a 
freelance writer from Boston or New York or Pittsburgh. 
Comment from Benn Konsynski: 
I think there were three of them from Pittsburgh writers that I saw. My empirical 
studies have shown that Pittsburgh actually has a higher incidence of them! 
Question from the audience: 
As another "freelance" writer from Boston, I just wanted to comment that I think 
there are a lot of those fast and shallow studies. But in fairness, I don't think that Wall 
Street Journal article was necessarily inaccurate ... 
Response from Charles Kriebel: 
I'm not necessarily criticizing Gary's work -- certainly not! 
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Follow-up question from the audience: 
To bring this back to some of the things we were talking about in the beginning, an 
obvious answer to the case study research writer, or econometric research writer, is that both 
of them have their appropriate areas. 
I'd like to ask each of the panelists to talk about some of the areas in which case 
study research might be useful to identify some of the things that are being mismeasured or 
not measured at all by econometric studies. It seems that one approach might be to say we 
will measure certain things in the existing productivity statistics. But, talk to managers and 
they're actually interested in a different list of issues, or a list that includes some other issues. 
I'd like for both of you to comment in the abstract, or ideally, specifically on what 
some of those other issues that are not being measured by the econometric method. 
Response from Charles Kriebel: 
I think earlier I said that there was a comment made by Peter Keen (and this may 
end up being a summation) regarding reference disciplines. 
I think that it's not just economics or case studies. I think it's sociology and other 
areas of knowledge. I think that academic researchers in the IS area that ignore those 
reference disciplines do so at their peril, because a lot of the research that's there has a 
tradition behind it in terms of developing results. 
I think the question that will continue to challenge us is: Which of those reference 
disciplines are relevant? 
Don't redo their work badly, but say, how can I extend that analysis to make 
contributions for this particular domain -- as opposed to the economy as a whole. I think 
everybody here probably knew at the outset that Benn and I are not polemics at either 
extreme in our views about research. It's clear that there are limitations of some approaches 
and advantages of other approaches. 
I think we want to be aware that there is aportfolio of research methods out there. 
We should use out best judgement for which applies where, or what are the 
advantages that will enable us to get the most out of our analysis with a particular 
methodology in our study of information technology investments. 
Comment from 'Benn Konsynski: 
We also need to appreciate that we talk about cases at the Harvard Business School 
in two ways: in terms of what we call a "research case" versus a "teaching case". Most of 
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what we see in the public domain are what we call teaching cases. These are cases that are 
used as a basis to stimulate discussion of general management issues, not to make the case 
necessarily by themselves. 
One of my frustrations is that the cases I've found most interesting to work on have 
been those that have been related to failure. Yet, I find in the marketplace, especially in 
my portfolio of cases, that you most often select the success stories for your own teaching. 
These are the success stories that you're either leveraging inside your educational 
community, or using when you go out to consult. 
You're not thinking of my interesting stories which are failures. I also find that those 
are more poorly received in the general discussion, for some reason, in our case teaching. 
We might be able to explain that people will come away from even mediocre discussions 
of successful stories much happier than they do from great discussions of abject failures, 
which they probably identify with. So we have a challenge in that the cases that are the 
most widely circulated were not created for the purpose of explaining a business 
phenomenon, as much as they are to stimulate a discussion on a general management issue. 
We're misusing those cases. We're misapplying them in our service as research cases 
when they were not necessarily intended as such. 
Comment from Charles Kriebel: 
Yes, I think that's a good quest. Failures, I think, are like history. If you ignore the 
history of failures, you're probably bound to repeat them. 
Closing comment from h j i v  Banker: 
Panel chairs usually have to end by reconciling the different positions. In this case, 
the two panel members have already reconciled their positions. This allows us to end this 
session before the Heisman Trophy award ceremonies begin and the football team arrives. 
Let me thank the two panel members for their fine discussion! 
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